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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 15-1595 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMES EDWARD CLARK, 
 
    Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-08-cr-00508-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 4, 2016 
  
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 15, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 James Edward Clark appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to 
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because we agree with 
the District Court that Clark’s defense counsel was not ineffective, we will affirm. 
I 
 Clark was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of attempting to 
manufacture methamphetamine under 18 U.S.C. § 846 and one count of possessing red 
phosphorous under 18 U.S.C. § 841(c)(1). After a three-day jury trial, he was convicted 
on both counts and the District Court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment. We 
upheld Clark’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. See United States v. Clark, 419 
F. App’x 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 The Government’s case at trial relied principally on testimony from a confidential 
informant who had agreed to cook methamphetamine for Clark. Clark in turn supplied the 
informant with precursor materials and equipment, including laboratory-grade glassware, 
red phosphorous, and ephedrine. The ephedrine that Clark provided, however, was 
actually a mixture of niacinamide, dimethyl sulfone, and nicotinic acid. None of these 
compounds are chemical precursors to methamphetamine or implicated in its synthesis, 
facts that the Government conceded in its opening and closing arguments and that Clark’s 
defense counsel repeatedly emphasized. Clark’s defense revolved around a theory that he 
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had intentionally supplied fake ephedrine in the hopes of either defrauding the informant 
or taking revenge on the informant for past debts.  
 Following his unsuccessful direct appeal, Clark filed a pro se motion under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 in the District Court asserting several collateral attacks on his criminal 
sentence. The District Court appointed new counsel for Clark and conducted two 
evidentiary hearings, at one of which Clark presented expert testimony from a forensic 
chemist. Clark’s trial counsel also testified. Clark then filed a counseled motion asserting 
that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for: (1) not retaining a forensic 
chemist to rebut the Government’s expert; (2) advising Clark not to testify in his own 
defense; and (3) failing to investigate and present several witnesses to testify on Clark’s 
behalf. The District Court considered each of Clark’s arguments, but denied his motion. 
Clark appealed.1 
II 
 Whether counsel’s performance is deficient under the Sixth Amendment requires a 
showing that: (1) discrete acts or omissions by counsel “were outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance” and not the “result of reasonable professional 
judgment”; and (2) as a consequence, “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
                                                 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction over Clark’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 and issued a certificate of appealability on March 20, 2015. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review the District Court’s factual findings for 
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 
289 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694 (1984). “A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. We “indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance,” i.e., that “the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial 
strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
A 
 Clark first claims that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to retain a 
forensic chemist to rebut the Government’s expert witness. He suggests that a defense 
expert could have undermined the Government’s claim that he intended to manufacture 
methamphetamine by testifying that the materials Clark provided could not have been 
turned into methamphetamine. He further argues that the expert could have testified 
about Clark’s sophistication in providing the informant with laboratory-grade 
glassware—implying that Clark would have known the ephedrine was fake—and that 
Clark did not provide the informant with all necessary materials (such as iodine) for a 
successful synthesis. 
 The District Court considered each of these contentions and found them 
unpersuasive. As the Court observed: (1) the Government readily conceded that it would 
have been impossible for the informant to synthesize methamphetamine from Clark’s 
supplies; (2) Clark’s counsel repeatedly challenged the Government’s witnesses—
including the informant and the Government’s forensic chemist—on this point; and (3) 
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the jury was made aware of the fact that Clark had supplied a laboratory-grade flask and 
other necessary reagents, both indicative of his knowledge and sophistication.  
 We agree with the District Court. At best, the expert testimony Clark sought 
would have been duplicative of evidence and arguments introduced by counsel through 
other means. At worst, the expert’s testimony could have cut against Clark, for example 
by showing that he intended to rely on the informant’s assistance or that he was 
sophisticated in the business of making and selling methamphetamine. Accordingly, 
Clark’s claim fails to overcome the presumption that his counsel’s decision not to employ 
an expert was strategic.2  
B 
 Next, Clark contends his counsel was ineffective because he advised Clark not to 
testify. According to Clark, his testimony would have been the only direct evidence of his 
intent, the need for which was particularly acute because the District Court had already 
ruled that his involvement in a 2007 methamphetamine cook was admissible. As the 
District Court observed, however, counsel had “a number of sound tactical reasons” for 
giving this advice. App. 16. Clark’s testimony would have opened him to cross-
examination on statements made shortly after his arrest. In those statements, Clark agreed 
                                                 
 2 Clark also complains that the Government notified him of its intention to 
introduce expert testimony just three days before trial—in violation of Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G)—and that his counsel failed to object or ask for a 
continuance despite this obvious error. In fact, the record shows that the Government 
gave Clark notice of its expert on November 10, 2008, three months before trial. 
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to turn over nineteen additional pounds of ephedrine, which subsequent testing revealed 
to be niacinamide, the same substance he had supplied to the informant. Such testimony 
would have seriously undermined the defense, which turned entirely on Clark knowing 
the ephedrine was fake. And Clark would have had to explain away a number of 
practically “unexplainable” statements recorded by the informant, as well as account for 
exactly why he was in possession of paraphernalia associated with “clandestine 
methamphetamine laboratories.” App. 279, 499. For these reasons, we agree with the 
District Court that advising Clark not to testify was an exercise of “reasonable 
professional judgment,” well within the “wide range” of reasonable conduct permitted 
under Strickland. 466 U.S. at 690–91.  
C 
 Finally, Clark asserts that counsel failed to investigate and present several 
potential defense witnesses: Ron Lavan, Sherry Baker, and Mary Lynn Hallas, and Eric 
Rolfing.3 We have recognized that, in certain circumstances, “a complete failure to 
investigate potentially corroborating witnesses” can constitute ineffective assistance. See, 
e.g., United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. 
Debango, 780 F.2d 81, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).  
  As part of Clark’s habeas case, Lavan, Baker, and Hallas submitted affidavits 
setting forth the general content of what their testimony would have been at trial, and 
                                                 
 3 The parties do not agree on the spelling of Rolfing’s name, so we have adopted 
the District Court’s version.  
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stating that they would have been willing to testify on Clark’s behalf had they been 
asked. Lavan’s affidavit avers that he observed Clark using “Vitablend” as a “supplement 
in protein drinks,” and that he helped transfer the supplement into plastic bags Clark gave 
to the informant and later turned over to federal agents. Supp. App. 65–66. Baker and 
Hallas’s affidavits aver that they helped Clark order Vitablend about a year before the 
events giving rise to his indictment. 
 Notwithstanding their support for Clark, none of these potential witnesses testified 
at either of the evidentiary hearings conducted by the District Court. Clark’s trial counsel, 
however, did testify, and stated that he interviewed both Lavan and Baker, but did not 
recall anything about Hallas. The Court’s decision to credit trial counsel’s testimony that 
he investigated these potential witnesses is therefore not clearly erroneous.4 We also 
agree that counsel had tactical reasons for not calling these witnesses. Clark’s post-arrest 
statements implicated Lavan as the source of the (fake) ephedrine, which severely 
undercut Lavan’s value as a defense witness. Baker and Hallas’s testimony about events 
in 2007 would have been minimally probative about Clark’s activities in 2008, and only 
tangentially relevant to whether he believed the fake ephedrine to be real. Moreover, trial 
counsel testified that, with respect to Baker and Hallas, “a couple witnesses . . . did not 
                                                 
 4 We also note that when a district court holds an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 
motion, parties must do more than just submit affidavits when the facts are in dispute, as 
“contested fact issues in section 2255 cases cannot be resolved on the basis of affidavits 
alone.” Gov’t of V.I. v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1077 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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want to get involved, and I believe that they made that decision fairly close in time to the 
trial date.” App. 507.5  
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
                                                 
 5 As to Rolfing, there is no evidence of record establishing what his testimony 
would have been. Clark’s pro se motion mentions a forthcoming affidavit from Rolfing, 
but no such affidavit was submitted. Nor did Rolfing testify during Clark’s evidentiary 
hearings. Accordingly, Clark’s argument regarding Rolfing’s potential testimony 
amounts to “mere speculation” insufficient to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Gray, 878 F.2d at 712. 
